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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN. v. WELLER: PRELIMINARY
BREATH TESTS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HEARINGS
By: McEvan H. Baum
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that prelir:ninary breath tests ("PBTs") are admissible in administrative
hearings. 390 Md. 115, 121-22, 887 A.2d 1042 at 1046. In so
holding, the Court concluded that such forums are not "court actions"
or "civil actions" under MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. Section 16.205.2(c).
Id. at 139, 887 A.2d at 1056.
On May 16, 2004, Officer Shuster of the Hampstead Police pulled
over respondent Steven Weller's ("Weller") white Chevrolet after it
crossed over a set of double yellow lines. Upon approaching Weller,
Officer Shuster observed several clues which led him to believe
Weller was intoxicated. Weller subsequently admitted that he had
consumed six beers. After Weller failed a field sobriety test, a PBT
was administered, which indicated Weller's blood alcohol
concentration was 0.16. Weller was then arrested for driving under
the influence.
Following his arrest, Weller refused to submit to a chemical breath
test. In consequence, pursuant to Section 16-205.1, Weller was issued
a Suspension Order informing him that his license would be
suspended. In accordancl."! with Section 16-205.1(b)(3)(v)(1), Weller
requested an administrative hearing to allow him to show cause as to
why his license should not be suspended.
During the hearing, the Motor Vehicle Administration
("Administration") admitted several documents into evidence,
including the DR-15 and the DR-15A Officer Certification and Order
of Suspension which contained Weller's PBT result. While Weller did
not object to the admittance of any evidence, he did proffer that his
one-year suspension (as a repeat offender) should be reduced so he
could drive to and from daily inspections to fulfill his duties as an
insurance adjuster. After considering the evidence before her,
including the PBT result, the administrative law judge ("ALl")
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suspended Weller's license for one year, as mandated by Section 16205. 1(b)(1)(i)(2)(B). The statute provides that where a "licensed
person" who has already refused to submit to a chemical test refuses
an additional test, that individual's license shall be suspended for one
year.
The Circuit Court for Carroll County reversed the decision and
vacated Weller's suspension on the primary ground that the ALJ
violated Section 16.205.2(c) by considering Weller's PBT result. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether
PBTs are admissible in administrative hearings under Section 16205.2(c), as well as whether the circuit court "improperly substituted
its judgment" for the Administration in reversing the ALJ's decision.
The Court initially addressed the Administration's position that
Weller should not be able to appeal the PBT's admission because he
failed to object to its introduction in the preceding forums. Id. at 128,
887 A.2d at 1050-51. The Court noted several cases where it opined
that issues not raised during the administrative proceeding cannot be
raised during judicial review. Id. at 128-30, 887 A.2d at 1050-51.
However, the Court explained that the unpreserved issue needed to be
decided in the instant case because the circuit court did not separate
the issues that it considered. !d. at 130, 887 A.2d at 1051.
Addressing the ultimate issue of whether the PBT was properly
admitted during the hearing, the Court first cited the language of
Section 16-205.2(c), which provides in pertinent part that "[tJhe taking
of or refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test is not admissible in
evidence in any court action." Id. at 133, 887 A.2d at 1053. While
Weller argued that an administrative hearing can be considered a court
action because MD. CODE ANN., Crs. JUD. PROC. Section 1-101(c)
does not specifically define "court action," the Court was not
persuaded by this interpretation. Id. at 135, 887 A.2d at 1054.
Examining the definitions of both "court" and "action," the Court
declared that the "court action" language of Section 16-205.2(c) was
clear and unambiguous. Id. at 135, 887 A.2d at 1054. After noting
that the Black's Law Dictionary definition of action is "[aJ civil or
criminal judicial proceeding," the Court differentiated between actions
and administrative hearings. Id. at 135-38, 887 A.2d at 1054-56. In so
doing, the Court apprised that proceedings which take place in the
Court of Appeals, Court of Special Appeals, circuit court, district
court, or an orphans' court are court actions, while administrative
hearings before administrative agencies or administrative judges
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pursuant to Section 16-205.1 are not court actions. ld. at 135, 887
A.2d at 1054.
Continuing its analysis, the Court of Appeals discussed case law
that buttressed its interpretation. Id. at 136-38, 887 A.2d at 1054-56.
The Court began by citing Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 302, 711 A.2d
1319, 1328 (1998), where it found that collateral estoppel did not
operate in driver's license suspension hearings because "Section 16205. I-type proceedings do not sufficiently resemble court
proceedings." Id. at 136, 887 A.2d at 1054. Explaining the
distinction, the Court in Janes stated that administrative courts are
provided in license suspension hearings to ensure that individuals
receive "minimally necessary due process" before an "important
privilege" is temporarily revoked. Id., 887 A.2d at 1054. Moreover,
the Court asserted that the General Assembly has unequivocally made
certain that criminal proceedings under Section 21-902 of the
Transportation Article and administrative proceedings pursuant to
Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article are independent of one
another by its enactment of Section 16-205(1)(1). Id.
The Court found additional support for its conclusion in Harmon v.
State, 147 Md. App. 452, 809 A.2d 696 (2002), where the Court of
Special Appeals found the trial court erred in admitting a defendant's
PBT results into evidence at a probation violation hearing. Id., 887
A.2d at 1054-55. The Court drew a distinction between Harmon, a
criminal proceeding in circuit court, and the case sub judice, an
administrative hearing before an ALJ. Id. at 137,887 A.2d at 1055.
Delving further into its differentiation between court or civil
actions and administrative proceedings, the Court enumerated the
lenient evidentiary standards that govern administrative hearings. Id.
at 137-38, 887 A.2d at 1055. Such proceedings are generally infonnal
in nature and are not bound by technical rules of evidence. ld.
Subsequently, the Court refuted Weller's contention that
administrative hearings are court actions because they can be
appealed; reasoning that they are subject to limited standards of
review, and are considered as original actions for judicial review,
rather than appeals. Id. at 138,887 A.2d at 1056.
With respect to whether an administrative hearing could be
considered a civil action, the Court found such a comparison was
inapposite. Id. at 138, 887 A.2d at 1056. Unlike the procedural
requirements which initiate an administrative hearing, a civil action is
commenced when a complaint is filed with a court. Id. (citing Md.
Rule 2-101(a)).
Furthennore, Section 10-202(d) of the State
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Government Article defines administrative proceedings as "contested
cases," rather than civil actions. Id. at 138-39,887 A.2d at 1056.
Finally, the Court briefly addressed the second issue of whether the
circuit court inappropriately substituted its judgment in place of the
Administration's in determining that the ALl failed to consider
Weller's type of employment and the length of time passed since
Weller's prior chemical breath test refusal. Id. at 139, 877 A.2d at
1056. In holding that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard of
review, the Court observed that the review of an administrative
agency's decision is limited to determining whether the record
supports the agency's findings and whether the decision was based on
an erroneous conclusion oflaw. ld. at 141, 887 A.2d at 1057. Finding
that the record satisfied the substantial evidence test, and having
already concluded that the PBT was properly admitted in the
administrative proceeding, the Court reversed the decision of the
circuit court. ld. at 144-45, 887 A.2d at 1060.
In this case, the Court of Appeals established that PBTs are
admissible in administrative hearings. In so holding, the Court has
expanded the broad scope of evidence that can be admitted before
administrative agencies. As a result, defense attorneys in DDI cases
should anticipate that such evidence will be introduced against their
clients in these proceedings.

